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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
(;J,;H"\LI> .J. l'HKASOX and \'IOLA M. 
CHEAt-\<lX, and CO:N"-
STHFCTOHI:::;, J :\C., a eorporation, 
Plai 11 t i_tj's-lles pmzdc 11 t ", 
v . 
. \HX'I' Ll';HUY PETI<:HS()X and RLTBY 
\\'. his ''"ife, 
Dcfc11d ants-A ppellauts. 
Case No. 
11878 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for breach of 
the c.:oyeuants of a Utah statutory form of warranty 
deed. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
Plaintiff's-Respondents received a judgment in the 
sum of plus interest. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the judgment of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 20th day of December, 1963, Appellants 
gave Respondents a Warranty Deed (Plfs ex. 2 and 
R-5), conveying certain property in Salt Lake County. 
The starting point of the description was the intersec-
tion of the center lines of 9th East and 56th South 
Streets which point was also related to a corner of a 
quarter quarter section. The description did not ref er 
to a fence line. At the trial two ( 2) survey plats 
(Plfs ex 3 and 4) of the property prepared by Sur-
veyor Charles V. King were received in evidence upon 
the stipulation of Appellants that if King was called 
he would testify that he had prepared them (R-73 
line 38 and R-74 line 12). Robert B. Jones testified 
for Respondents that his field crew, including at least 
one licensed surveyor acting under his direction field 
checked the first plat prepared by Surveyor King 
( R-7 5 line 22) and discovered an error which he be-
lieved was a chaining error ( R-82 line 18) ; that he 
pointed that error out to King (R-76 line 2), who then 
sent his field crew out to check to discrepancy. The 
second survey plat was then prepared by King to cor-
rect that discrepancy. Jones testified that the corrected 
suney was accurate (R-76 line 15). He testified that 
his crew's field notes began at a monument at the center 
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of 5tith South aBd 9th East designatiBg the center 
of that intersection (R-78 line 19 and R-77 line Hi); 
that ),,, kuew of that monument and had personally 
.iscd it at least twice in the previous year (R-80 line 
J ) . Ile further testified that it was customary ill the 
profession for a surveyor to rely on the field 
notes aBd fiBdings of his field crew ( R-88 line 2 5) . 
AppellaBts called two surveyor witnesses, each of 
whom testified that the second King surYey was done 
rnrrectly ( R-Ia4 line 2 & R-135 liBe 3, in accordance 
with good surveying practice and as they would have 
doue the survey if they had done it themselves ( R-Hli 
l iue . Each of the surveyors testified that that 
<:orner of the quarter quarter section was a paper tie 
(ll-81 line 26, R-128 line 15 and R-143 line 9); 
that there was no marker or monument designating 
that point; and that it was proper to rely on the monu-
mcBt at the intersection of 56th South and 9th East 
as King had done (R-78 line 19), R-134 line 9, and 
R- H6 line 7) . Appellants' witness, Goff, testified that 
accordnig to the "Old Bible" kept in the County Sur-
n·yor's Office the original survey of that intersection 
'ms accomplished in 1896 and that road stones were 
located at all four corners of the intersection at that 
time ( ll-127 line 11) . 
The survey plat which all of the experts agreed was 
properly prepared shows the Northerly line of the 
dcseribed property to be 4.5 to 4.1 feet North of and 
outside of a fence that is upon the ground (Plfs ex :3). 
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Mr. Erekson testified that his family owned and were 
in possession of the property North of that fence since 
1920 (R-120 line 28 & R-122 line 5). 
Don A. Stringham testified at length about his 
efforts expended to obtain surveys, examine title, pre-
pare and obtain quit-claim deeds both between Re-
spondents and other owners and between Respondents 
and their purchasers, to conform the property delivered 
to that described and to satisfy Respondents purchasers 
of the identically described property respecting the 
land that Respondents had sold but failed to deliver 
(R-91line1 and R-116 line 6). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY 
DESCRIBED DID NOT COINCIDE 'VI'fH 
THE PROPERTY FENCED IS COMPETENT 
AND UNCONTRADICTED. 
Appellants assert without citation of precedent or 
authority that Robert Jones testimony that the second 
King Survey was accurate based upon the investiga-
tion, verification, and field notes of his field crew, 
which included a licensed surveyor was incompetent, ap-
parently because he did not personally hold the tape or 
sight the transit to make the required measurements. 
I assume that if he had held the tape or sighted the 
instrument Appellants would claim the testimony of 
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the person holding the other end of the tape was also 
required. The cases hold otherwise. 32 C.J.S. .J.Hl 
· 1!1lle1 the heading Evidence, subsection 5J(j ( 112), 
e1 it it led "'Surveying" states the rule as follows: 
"A surveyor may interpret the field notes of 
another, where a proper foundation is laid ... " 
ln the case of Warczynski v. Bamycz, 117 A 2<l 
573, cited in support of the statement in C.J.S., the 
Supreme Court of :\Iaryland held that an employee 
iu a suneyor's office could testify concerning a plat 
prepared by his employer's off ice and the field notes 
of the survey on which the plat was based, even though 
he had not made the plat or participated in the survey 
(the employer was ill), on the basis that such survey 
and notes were made and kept in the regular course 
of business. 
POINT II 
THEHE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
,\PP ELLAN T'S THEORY THAT THE PROP-
ER COl\I:\IENCEMENT POINT 'VAS IN LIN)<_: 
\\'lTH THE NORTH FENCE. 
Appellants introduced the testimony of two expert 
witnesses at the trial-both they and Robert Jones 
re.i cctc<l the invitation of Appellants' counsel to agree 
that the fence was the proper starting point (R-81 line 
.). R-8!J line 27, R-131line12, and R-HJ line 16). All 
three a<rrecd that the Kini.r Survey was correctlv made. b • • 
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Appellants apparently contend that Judge Elton 
should have rejected their expert testimony and should 
himself have determined that the starting point was 
in line with the fence based solely on the recitation in 
several old deeds (the last was in 1943), not including 
the deed in question, that such point was in line with 
a fence (Defs ex 7 Abstract Page 26 and earlier 
pages). Even if one concludes that the fence which 
had been re-built several times over the years (R-123 
line 16) had not been moved, there is no indication 
approaching the quality of admissible evidence that it 
was originally in line with such starting point. That 
the starting point in those descriptions is not only 
double but triple tied (the fence, the intersection, and 
the quarter quarter corner) suggests some insecurity 
on the part of the grantor. It is a matter of common 
knowledge, about which the Court can take judicial 
notice, that the location of fence lines is often approxi-
mated and that succeeding grantors merely copy the 
description used by their grantor. If it was not common 
knowledge, each of the expert witnesses so testified 
in this case (R-81 line 5, R-131 line 5, and R-144 lines 
13-21). The source of the dispute in this case is the 
failure of Appellants to continue the practice of refer-
ring to the fence in their description. If they had done 
so Respondent would presumably have continued the 
practice and we would all have been spared this com-
paratively small but tedious dispute. 
Appellants have in this case relied on the Reese 
v. ft-lurdocl.· Case, 121 Ut. 517, 243 P2d 948, wherein 
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the Court concluded that where the monwnent for the 
same 11uarter quarter section mentioned in the instant 
description (and described by each of the surveyor 
witnesses as a paper tie) was missing or never present 
and where its location was uncertain even by calculation, 
a fence, regarded prior to the survey by everyone 
involved to he on the section line was a more reliable 
monument than the old survey notes which supported 
the calculations on which surveys conflicting with that 
fence were based. The Court indicated its uncertainty 
about its decision as follows: 
"There seems to be no possibility that anyone 
will ever dispute the right of plaintiffs to the 
property to that fence line, and should such dis-
pute arise he may rely on his warranty deed 
and look to the Whites to make it good. 'Vhere 
this quarter quarter corner was under the original 
and as re-established cannot he demon-
strated and under the evidence is very uncertain, 
hut the situation demands that it he made certain 
by this decision, as between these parties. The 
existence of this fence line under these facts and 
circumstances is sufficient to sustain the finding 
of the trial court's decision." 
The instant case is very different. The monument 
marking the intersection of 56th South and 9th East 
to which the description is tied was in place and used 
by the surveyors. Despite Appellants' effort at trial 
to render its location uncertain, all of the expert wit-
nesses testified that the intersection had been clearly 
marked since 1896, except for brief periods where the 
markers or monuments were destroyed or removed 
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aud had to Lie replaced (R-77 line lti, ll-1:27, 
line 11, awl R-141 line 1). 
Presumauly, there was some competent evi<le11et 
to support the determination in the Rce1Se t'. 1llurducl" 
case that the fence was in fact on the section li11c. In 
the instant case that determination would have to de-
pend upou recitations in deeds which were in all 
probability simply based on similar recitations iu prior 
deeds. 'V c have no indication of the basis of the original 
recitation. in the instant case the trial court 
determined on competent evidence that the description 
aml the fence line did not coincide. Even if there was 
competent evidence to the contrary and Respondents 
claim there was not, Judge Elton's determination made 
as it was on the oasis of his observation of the witnesses 
and their testimony, shoudl be upheld. 
POINT Ill 
APPELLANTS' CO YEN ANTS OF IET 
AND YVARRANTY "rERE 
BROKEN BY THE CONSTRUCTIYE EYIC-
TION OF RESPONDENTS AND TIIEIH 
GHAXTEES FROM 'l'HE LAND CON,'EYED 
TO LYING NORTH OF THE FENCE. 
Erekson clearlv testified that he and his familr . . 
had owned and been in possession of the laud lyiug 
North of the fence since 1920 ( R-120 line 19 and fol-
lowing). It is likely that his chain of title derires 
from conveyances us mg the fence as a starting poiut 
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in which case he is probably the owner by grant of 
the strip cf land North of the fence. If not he was 
iu t)pen notorious possession for some forty nine years 
«ll<l had acquired it by adverse possession. Short of 
that all of the recent decisions of this Court indicate 
to this writer that he would be declared to be the owner 
under the doctrine of "Boundary by Acquiescence". 
See particularly King v. Frong, 14 Ut 2d 135, 378 
P 2d 893. Also see Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Ut. 2d, 282, 
4:21 P2d 944. Respondents cannot even claim that their 
grantors grantors or the grantors grantor before him 
had title to that strip by grant or otherwise because 
the descriptions in their respective conveyances began 
from the fence line. Appellants dilemma is simply 
that they received a conveyance of one piece of prop-
erty and conveyed to Respondents a slightly different 
one relying on some previous grantor's prediction that 
the point of beginning was at the fence line without 
protecting themselves by tying their point of beginning 
to the fence line. 
In any event the cases do not require Respondents 
to become a trespasser and be evicted or to bring a 
useless and losing action to quiet title in order to obtain 
damages for their grantor's breach of the covenants of 
warranty and quiet possession. The rule is noted at 20 
Am .Tur 2d, 630, Covenants, as follows: 
"§ 61. Inability of grantee to obtain possession 
from adverse claimant. 
As a general rule, where at the time of the 
conYeyance the premises are in the possession 
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of a third person claiming uu<ler a paramount 
title, so that the covenantee is unable to obtain 
possession of the property, a constructive eviction 
exists which supports an immediate action for 
breach of the covenant of warranty. The reaso11 
most frequently given for this rule is that the 
law will not compel the grantee to commit a 
trespass in order to establish a lawful right in 
another action. lVhere the covenantor has no 
title, possession of the premises by a third person 
under color of title has been held sufficient to 
amouu t to a constructive eviction breaking the 
covenant." 
The entire subject is discussed in an annotation 
entitled ""That Amounts to a Constructive Eviction, 
\Yhich \Vill Support Action for Breach of Covenant 
of \V arranty or for Quiet Enjoyment" at 172 A..L.R. 
18. under subparagraph VIII entitled "Inability of 
Grantee to Obtain Possession", subparagraph E-J 
entitled "Adverse Possession By One Under Color of 
Title'', the rule is stated. 
"\Yhere the covenantor has no title, possession 
of a third person under color by title has been 
held sufficient to amount to a constructive evic-
tion." 
No contrary decisions were noted. 
Judge Elton was and is perfectly capable of deter-
mining whether Respondents were reasonable in not 
trespassing, in not bringing a losing quiet title action 
and in fact in proceeding as they did to remedy the 
situation and satisfy their grantees. 
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POINT IV 
HESPONDENTS ACTIONS TO REMEDY 
THE DEFECTIVE TITLE AND TO SATISFY 
THEIR GRANTEES WERE INCURRED AS 
A RESULT OF APPELLANTS' BREACH; 
\VERE REASONABLE; WERE LEGALLY 
CO)iPENSABLE; AND THE AMOUNT 
:\\VARDED BY THE COURT AS COMPEN-
SATION WAS NOT EXCESSIVE. 
Some of the expense and activity of Respondents· 
attorney to remedy the breach was addressed to clarify-
ing title to the fence lines on the East and South sides 
of the property. Appellants' claim that activity and ex-
pense should not be compensated because they point out, 
it was to obtain title to land outside the land conveyed, 
which is true. The point is, it was in an effort to satisfy 
Respondents' grantees and not to obtain additional 
land for Respondents themselves that such activity 
was undertaken. Respondents eventually satisfied their 
grantees and protected their sale by clarifying title 
to thal property and crediting them $200.00 on the 
agreed purchase price because they could not obtain 
title to the apparently desirable North strip. Obviously, 
clarifying title to the South and East strips was a part of 
the consideration given to Respondents' grantees with-
out which the price concession on the North strip would 
not have been available, whereupon said grantees could 
hiffe rescinded their purchase and Respondents' dam-
ages would have been greater. Whether Respondents' 
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activities on the South and East strips are <lescribe<l 
in terms of mitigation of damages or expense reasou-
a bly incurred to correct Appellants' breach, the result 
is the same. 
It is helpful to look at this problem through Re-
spondents' eyes. They bought a tract of property and 
sold that tract by a deed using an identical description. 
\\'hen their grantees discovered the title line and fence 
discrepancy they asked Respondents to correct it. 
Respondents hired Don A. Stringham, a qualified 
attorney, who I submit proceeded reasonably to obtain 
surveys, title reports, quit claim deeds, satisfaction 
of judgments, agreements and an adjustment of 
price with Respondents grantees respecting the prop-
erty he could not obtain because the owner would not 
sell it. In this process Respondents incurred and paid 
$750.00 in attorney's fees and $499.00 in expenses. 
The Court apparently in a gesture of compromise 
because of the hot dispute gave Respondents judgment 
for only $720.00. Respondents have only the benefit 
of a bargain he was entitled to, less $1,249.00 in actual 
expense, less also the expense of a trial and this appeal. 
Appellants who caused the difficulty by selling prop-
erty they didn't own now claim that imposing $720.00 
of that expense on them is excessive and unreasonable. 
Appellants have in their brief attempted to limit 
Respondents' damages to only certain of his expenses, 
but clearly all of said expenses were incurred by Re-
spondents to correct a problem they caused. 
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Courts generally and Utah in particular have 
allowed Plaintiffs in actions for breach of covenants of 
wiuranty and quiet enjoyment all of their costs includ-
jqg reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred to 
maintain or def end title to the premises conveyed. See 
VanCott v. Jacklin, 63 Ut. 412, 226 Pac. 460 at Page 
.J;o3 for the Utah rule. For the rule generally see the 
annotation entitled "Damages for Breach of Covenants 
of Title" at 61 ALR 10, particularly subsection XIV 
beginning at Page 154. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' theory of the case is not supported by 
the evidence. If it was, the trial court found against 
them on the basis of competent evidence. Respondents 
proceeded reasonably to satisfy the claims of their 
grantees. The expenses they incurred were directly 
caused by Appellants' breach of their covenants and 
warranty and quiet enjoyment. Even though the trial 
court did not give them judgment for all of the expenses 
they incurred as a result of that breach, Respondents 
now ask that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gerald E. Nielson 
840 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
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